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 Since the mid-twentieth century it has generally been recognized that 
medical practitioners have a duty to provide information to patients before 
the patients can give a valid consent to treatment or participation in research. 
The term “informed consent” is now widely applied to describe such consent. 
The term “informed consent” was used in several non-medical contexts 
before it came to be used in the medical context. This article reviews the 
various uses of “informed consent” up to the first court decision that used it in 
a medical context. 
 
 There was a general requirement for consent to medical treatment 
and research prior to the introduction of the duty to provide information. In 
many contexts of life, there is no duty for others to provide information. In 
those other contexts, the law steps in only when there is an affirmative 
misrepresentation. Omissions violate no duty and are often expected.  In 
those contexts, persons need to make their own effort to acquire whatever 
information they feel they need before making a decision.  Thus, there is no 
requirement that those consents be informed consents. However, often the 
distinction is overlooked and the term “informed consent” is automatically 
used when only consent is required or in fact obtained. 
 
 Where did this ubiquitous term “informed consent” come from?  
 
 It is not of critical importance to track the source of the term.  It has 
taken on its own life and those who practice law, medicine and ethics in the 
twenty-first century inform their actions with the subsequent robust clinical 
experience, legal developments and literature. However, many writers and 
speakers do comment on the source of the term and, when they do so, it is 
important to be accurate. 
 
 “Informed consent” did not originate in the medical context. This 
article will first discuss the beginnings of the use of “informed consent” in the 
medical context and then review its earlier use in numerous other contexts. 
This article focuses on the use of “informed consent” in the English 
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language. Parallel terms in other languages are beyond the scope of this 
article.   
  
 This article was created by searching several databases of full text 
articles and books that are available online or through subscribed services at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison libraries. It is likely that additional uses 
of the term will be discovered as more materials become available for such 
searches. 
 
MEDICAL CONTEXT 
 
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 
 
SALGO V. LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES 
 
 The first time “informed consent” appeared in an American court 
decision in a medical context was on October 22, 1957 in a malpractice 
decision of the California Court of Appeals - Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. 
University Board of Trustees.1  
 
 Judge Absalom F. Bray2 included the following in his decision in the 
Salgo case: 
 
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to 
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis 
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. 
Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a 
procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the 
same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above 
all else and this very fact places him in a position in which he 
sometimes must choose between two alternative courses of action. 
One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical 
procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in 
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may 
as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact 
minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks by 
reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The 
other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, 
that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in 
 
1  Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 
170, (1st App. Dist. Oct. 22, 1957). 
2 Judge Bray (1889-1987) served full-time on the California Court of Appeals from 1946 to 
1964 and was presiding judge from 1959 to 1964. He continued to serve on a part-time 
basis until 1983. A. Bray, former appeal court chief dies, LOS ANGELES TIMES, January 3, 
1987. 
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certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of 
risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with 
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.3  
[Underlining the term “informed consent” in the quotations in this 
paper is added.] 
 
 This paragraph of the court’s opinion was copied verbatim from a 
friend of the court brief submitted by Paul G. Gebhard, a Chicago attorney, 
on behalf of the American College of Surgeons.4 It is ironic that the term that 
later caused so much concern among surgeons was first introduced in a 
malpractice court decision through the words of a brief filed on the behalf of 
their national organization. Gebhard is often credited with introducing the 
term “informed consent.”5 Gebhard deserves the credit for first use of the 
term “informed consent” in a medically related court decision, but he did not 
coin the term.  Although the widespread use of the term by courts and 
medical, legal and ethics writers began with Salgo, it had been used in 
medical and other contexts decades before Salgo. 
 
 Like several other important decisions in the history of consent, such 
as Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,6 the Salgo decision 
ultimately favored the physicians and hospital, not the patient. In July 1955, 
the jury and the trial court in Salgo had ruled in favor of the patient.7 The 
appellate court threw out this ruling based on errors in the jury instructions 
and authorized a new trial. The surgeons were most concerned about issues 
other than consent. The trial court had ruled that it was negligent to delegate 
the performance of risky procedures to resident surgeons or other assistants 
and that it was negligent to use a higher dosage of drug than was 
recommended in the manufacturer’s label. In October 1956, Dr. I.S. Rivlin, 
chairman of the Board of Regents of the American College of Surgeons 
spoke about these concerns in San Francisco.  The reports of Dr. Rivlin’s 
remarks did not mention the consent issue.8 To the relief of the American 
 
3 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, at 578, 317 P.2d 170, at 181. Most of the Salgo court decision 
including this paragraph was published by the American Medical Association without 
commentary in Salgo v. Stanford University Hospital et al., JAMA, 186(4):379-384 (Jan 25, 
1958). 
4 Jay Katz. THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (New York: Free Press 1984), 60, 
citing American College of Surgeon’s Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant and 
Appellant Frank Gerbode (1956). 
5 P.G. Gebhard, 69, developer of the term informed consent, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 27, 
1997, D21; Paul G. Gebhard, 69, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 22, 1997. 
6 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (April 14, 1914) [ruling for hospital on grounds of charitable 
immunity] 
7 $250,000 damage award against hospital, physician, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 18, 
1955, 4; S.F. Clerk wins $250,000 suit, OAKLAND TRIBUNE (Cal.), July 16, 1955, 23. 
8 Surgeon’s warning: Malpractice suits called peril, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 14, 
1956, 5; Suits menace modern surgery, says Dr. Rivlin. OAKLAND TRIBUNE (Cal.), Oct. 14, 
1956, 16-A; Leonard Engel, Doctors fear scientific setback, SYRACUSE HERALD AMERICAN 
(NY), Nov. 4, 1956, 1 & 3. 
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College of Surgeons, the appellate court found these rulings to be 
erroneous. One of the other errors dealt with the instructions on the consent 
issue. The paragraph after the one quoted above states: 
 
The instruction should be modified to inform the jury that the physician 
has such discretion consistent, of course, with full disclosure of facts 
necessary to an informed consent.9  
 
Some commentators have noted that this formulation left courts and 
practitioners with the difficulty of reconciling the discretion to withhold 
information with the duty to disclose information, until later court decisions 
established the priority of disclosure.10 
 
  USE OF TERM “INFORMED CONSENT” IN 1956-1957 
 
 In 1956 the medico-legal department of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) conducted a survey of over 7500 members of the AMA 
concerning their opinions about malpractice cases. Although court decisions 
and insurance rates had increased, doctors showed surprisingly little 
concern about malpractice cases. Nonetheless, the AMA and the American 
Hospital Association believed that steps could be taken to reduce the 
incidence of malpractice suits. One approach was through closer control of 
the medical record.  Through publications of these organization and their 
affiliated state organizations, they sought to increase the use of signed 
forms. This explains in part the increased organizational attention to consent 
during this period.11  
 
 The term “informed consent” was in use in a few publications of the 
American Medical Association and other Chicago-based medical 
organizations in late 1956 and early 1957 before the Salgo court decision. It 
is not clear whether Gebhard was responsible for those uses or the term was 
in use in these circles from some other source. Gebhard submitted the brief 
in the Salgo case in late 1956. He undoubtedly had discussions with his 
client about the brief before its submission; good legal practice and 
professional ethics would have dictated such conversations and ultimate 
client approval of the brief.12  
 
 One of the earlier uses of “informed consent” in the non-experimental 
medical context was a statement about ghost surgery and the role of 
resident surgeons in the operating room that was adopted by American 
 
9 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, at 578, 317 P.2d 170, at 181. 
10 E.g., Jay Katz. THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (New York: Free Press 1984), 
60-65. 
11 Neal C. Hogan, UNHEALED WOUNDS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY  
(New York: LFB Scholarly 2003), at 124-125. 
12 See supra note 3.  
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Board of Surgery on April 9, 1956. The Conference Committee on Graduate 
Training in Surgery (formed by the American College of Surgeons, the 
American Board of Surgery and the American Medical Association to 
coordinate standards for surgical residency programs) formulated the 
statement:  
 
Since the informed consent of the patient is a moral and legal 
prerequisite to the performance of a surgical operation, every patient 
about to undergo surgical operation, or his legal guardian, should 
have full and complete knowledge of the identity of his surgeon….13 
 
The statement was later approved by the Board of Regents of the American 
College of Surgeons, the American Medical Association, and the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. In June 1957 in an article on 
moral theology by John J. Lynch, the statement (with the term “informed 
consent”) was reprinted in a discussion of ghost surgery.14  
 
 The September 7, 1957 issue of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION included an article by the Law Department of the 
American Medical Association (AMA) entitled Consent to operations and 
other procedures. The article announced that it was the first of a series of six 
articles on medico-legal forms and that the AMA would soon be publishing a 
book containing the material from the six articles.  The article included: 
 
The consent given must be an informed consent with an 
understanding of what is to be done and of the risks involved.15 
 
 On September 27, 1957, the Legal Department of the American 
Medical Association published the booklet entitled MEDICOLEGAL FORMS WITH 
LEGAL ANALYSIS.  It contained the above sentence using the term “informed 
consent.”16   
 
 There were some publications in 1956 and 1957 by persons 
associated with organized medicine that addressed consent in the clinical 
context and did not use the term “informed consent,” so there is no indication 
the term was in general use at that time. Louis J. Regan used the term 
“understanding’” consent in his medical malpractice book in 1956.17 Robert 
 
13 Ghosting is out, MASSACHUSETTS PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1957, 98. 
14 John J. Lynch, Notes on moral theology, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, 18(2):216-248, at 234 
(June 1, 1957). 
15 Consent to operations and other procedures, JAMA, 165(1):65-70, at 66 (Sept. 7, 1957). 
16 American Medical Association, Law Department, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS, WITH LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (Chicago: American Medical Association 1957), 1. The publication date is from 
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS INCLUDING SERIALS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PERIODICALS - JULY-DECEMBER 1957, Catalog of Copyright Entries, Third 
Series, Vol. II, Part 1, Number 2  (Washington, D.C.:  Library of Congress 1958), 934. 
17 Louis J. Regan, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW (3d Edition) (1956), at 83, 
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S. Meyers gave a presentation on April 9, 1956 to the Ohio State Surgical 
Association that was published in the Bulletin of the American College of 
Surgeon in its September-October 1956 issue. In the course of advocating 
formal surgical training in a residency program in lieu of training through 
preceptorship, he discussed the matter of informing the patient, but did not 
use the term “informed consent.” 
 
There are other grave deficiencies in training obtained by 
preceptorship; it runs the very real risk of violating the fundamental 
honesty which must exist between the physician and his patient, 
unless the physician informs his private patient that he is learning to 
do this surgical procedure under the tutelage of a more competent 
surgeon. As it is unlikely that the patient would stand for his, it is 
equally unlikely that the patient will be so informed. There is no place 
for deceit in the practice of medicine.18  
 
Later in the article he mentions the College of Surgeons position on ghost 
surgery, again without using the term “informed consent” even though the full 
position statement used the term as discussed previously. 
 
In the case of surgical patients, the Board of Regents of the College, 
after due deliberation, issued the following opinion concerning the 
training of resident is surgery and surgical patients: “Ghost surgery is 
that surgery in which the patient is not informed of, or is misled as to, 
the identity of the operating surgeon.”19 
 
The same issue of the Bulletin contains an article prepared with the 
American College of Surgeon’s Professional Liability Program advisor that 
discusses malpractice concerns.  As to standard surgery it discusses only 
obtaining written consent, with no mention of providing information to the 
patient.  
 
Sometimes liability is incurred because the surgeon and the hospital 
have failed to obtain proper written consent to perform the indicated 
operative procedure.20  
 
Later in the article there is a discussion of providing information to patients 
when innovative therapy is used. 
 
 
18 What every surgeon should know today, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
SURGEONS, 41(5):207-208,426-428 (Sep.-Oct. 1956), at 426. 
19 Ibid., at 429. 
20 Operating room is focal point of malpractice hazard, careful study and effort are needed to 
reduce risk, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, 41(5):255-258 (Sep.-Oct. 
1956), at 257. 
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In critical cases, the surgeon may be called on, using his own best 
judgment, to try procedures that go beyond the usual, standard 
methods and may border on experimentation. When confronted with 
this situation, the surgeon should not undertake the “radical” 
procedure without consultation, and, if possible, the patient or a 
member of the patient’s family should be fully apprised of what is 
being done, and give his consent.21 
 
The WISCONSIN MEDICAL JOURNAL published an article on tips to avoid 
malpractice in its January 1957 issue.  One tip was to “be sure to get written 
consent for operations.” A model consent form is included. The discussion of 
providing information was: 
 
 Special attention should be given to operations which might or 
are likely to result I sterility. The trend of the cases in recent years 
indicates that it is extremely unwise to pursue a course of treatment 
that is self-hazardous or capable of producing harmful effect without 
securing a written statement from the patient or from someone legally 
responsible for the patient - a statement which clearly expresses 
understanding and consent to the specific treatment.22  
 
  USE OF TERM IN CLINICAL CONTEXT PRIOR TO 1956 
 
 Two uses of the term “informed consent” in a clinical context have 
been found before 1956.  
 
 In 1952 in the CURRENT LIST OF MEDICAL LITERATURE published by the 
Armed Forces Medical Library, the French article by Adrien Peytel entitled 
De la nécessité d’un consentement éclairé en cas d’électro-choc, from the 
September 1951 issue of PARIS MEDICAL, was translated as Necessity of 
informed consent in case of electro-shock.23 
 
 Adrien Peytel was a lawyer at the Cour d’Appel (Court of Appeal) in 
Paris. He was reporting about the case of Beynel v. Doctor Bourrat in Lyon, 
France. Miss Beynel had a bone broken during electroshock therapy and 
sued for failure to disclose this risk. The Court in Lyon ruled that the doctor 
did not have to disclose the risk or obtain her consent since the therapy was 
low risk. The term consentement éclairé (informed consent) was used only in 
the title of the article. In 1955, after the article was published, an appellate 
court reversed the decision. It found the doctor liable, ruling that he had a 
 
21 Ibid., at 258. 
22 25 pointers to prevent malpractice, WISCONSIN MEDICAL JOURNAL, 56:7-15 (Jan. 1957), at 
15. 
23 Armed Forces Medical Library, CURRENT LIST OF MEDICAL LITERATURE (Washington D.C. 
1952), Vol. 21, No. 1, Item 5437. The citation to Peytel’s article is PARIS MEDICAL, 41(35-
36):321-3 (Sep. 22-29, 1951). 
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contractual duty to disclose even this rare risk. The court rejected the 
physician’s assertion that due to her mental illness the patient was unable to 
understand such warnings and rejected that the danger of an adverse 
reaction to the warning would justify nondisclosure.24  
 
 In 1948, the Report of the Civil Rights Committee published in the 
JOURNAL OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, included the 
following: 
 
It is the opinion of the subcommittee that physical examination, and 
especially an examination of the sort conducted by the police and the 
Public Health department upon women prisoners, is an invasion of the 
individual’s right of privacy which should made in the absence of 
statutes only under conditions assuring an informed consent thereto 
on the part of the prisoner.25 
 
 PUBLIC HEALTH  
   
 One use of “informed consent” has been found in Congressional 
testimony in the public health debate over fluoridation of water. In May 1954, 
Dr. Paul Manning, a dentist opposed to fluoridation of water, submitted a 
statement at a hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce of the House of Representatives on a bill to ban fluoridation.  
 
 Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
you, do ye even so to them: for tis is the law of the prophets. - Mathew 
7:12. 
 This is, or should be, the doctor’s chart compiled by the Best of 
Pilots. 
 Taken as the basis for more than one professional society’s 
official code of ethics, this good law is not an implied license, even 
though some men clearly consider it to be one, to enter into the body 
of another for any purpose, lacking the full informed consent of the 
proposed receiver of benefits.26 
 
 
24 Beynel c. Docteur Bourrat, Dalloz, JURISPRUDENCE (1951) at 323 (Trib, civ. De Lyon Jan 
12, 1951, reversed Dalloz, JURISPRUDENCE (1956) at 3 (Cr. De Cassation Ch. civ. Ire Sect. 
civ., Nov. 8, 1955), as discussed in Thomas E. Carbonneau, Principles of medical and 
psychiatric liability in French law, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY, 29:742, 
762-763 (1980). 
25 Report of the Civil Rights Committee, JOURNAL OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, 15(8):331, 347 (Aug. 1948). 
26 Statement of Paul Manning in support of H.R. 341, A bill to protect the public health from 
the dangers of fluoridation of water, in Fluoridation of Water, Hearings before the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, Second 
Session, May, 25, 26, and 27, 1954 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office 
1954), 203, at 208. 
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MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 
 
 There were at least five writings using “informed consent” in the 
medical experimentation context before 1956. 
 
 In the fall of 1954, Irving Ladimer used “informed consent” in the 
context of medical research in an article in the Journal of Public Health Law.  
 
“Mental research, according to Dr. Paul Hoch, of the New York 
Psychiatric Institute and formed president of the American 
Psychopathological Association, is perhaps the most difficult. The 
subject may not be in a position to provide informed consent…”27 
 
At that time, Mr. Ladimer, a lawyer, was the Assistant Chief, Office of 
Research Planning, National Institutes of Health.  
 
 On November 17, 1953, the Director of the National Institutes of 
Health approved a policy entitled “Group consideration of clinical research 
procedures deviating from accepted practice or involving unusual hazard,” 
the precursor to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). The last paragraph of 
the document stated: 
 
He [the physician in charge of the patient] shall be responsible for 
incorporating in the medical record the information given the patient 
and the nature of the informed consent or agreement accomplished 
with the patient, including any comments, objections or general 
reactions made by the patient.28 
 
 In the same article Mr. Ladimer, referenced a memorandum from Dr. 
James M. Mackintosh to Dr. Russell Wilder, Director, National Institute of 
Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases, National Institutes of Health, entitled “the 
Ethical Aspect of Research,” dated Oct. 7, 1952: 
 
A further general comment on this subject was offered by the British 
scientist, Dr. James M. Mackintosh, in his capacity as special 
consultant to the Public Health Service in 1952. He notes: “There has 
been a movement of late to invite sick persons to cooperate in 
physical experiments upon themselves with the primary objective of 
elucidating, some fundamental problem of disease, without 
 
27 Irving Ladimer, Ethical and legal aspects of medical research on human subjects, 
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, 3(2): 467, 493 (Fall 1954). 
28 Posted at http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/NIH1953humansubjectpolicy.pdf 
[accessed 15 Sep. 2014]. 
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necessarily affecting their individual treatment.” For such effort, he 
also considers essential informed consent;…29 
 
 A letter dated November 5, 1947 from Carroll Wilson, first general 
manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, to Dr. Robert Stone, quoted 
from a “preliminary unpublished and restricted draft of the [Medical Board] 
report read to the Commissioners” as follows: 
 
The atmosphere of secrecy and suppression makes one aspect of the 
medical work of the Commission especially vulnerable to criticism. We 
therefore wish to record our approval of the position taken by the 
medical staff of the AEC in point of their studies of the substances 
dangerous to human life. We [the Medical Board of Review] believe 
that no substances known to be, or suspected of being, poisonous or 
harmful should be given to human beings unless all of the following 
conditions are fully met: (a) that a reasonable hope exists that the 
administration of such a substance will improve the condition of the 
patient, (b) that the patient give his complete and informed consent in 
writing, and (c) that the responsible next of kin give in writing a 
similarly complete and informed consent, revocable at any time during 
the course of such treatment.30 
 
 In 1934, Peter McEwan used “informed consent” in an article in the 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL. He interviewed patients on whom he had 
performed hysterectomies over an eight-year period. 112 of the 195 patients 
participated. He collected information on patient satisfaction, menopausal 
symptoms, justifiability of removing ovaries with the uterus, impact on sexual 
relationships, and effect on weight. In discussing neurosis after 
hysterectomy, he stated: 
 
Certain types of neurosis may be referred to. Morbidity owing to loss 
of the reproductive organs should be prevented by careful explanation 
before the operation. Hysterectomy is the most important operation 
that can be performed upon a woman, and calls for the full and 
informed consent of the patient, and her husband (if any)…. The 
husband ought to be consulted. Legally, indeed, he has no right to 
 
29 Ibid. at 493. 
30 Carroll Wilson, General Manager, AEC, to Robert Stone, University of California, 5 
November 1947 ("Your letter of September 18 regarding the declassification of biological 
and medical papers was read at the October 11 meeting of the Advisory Committee for 
Biology and Medicine.") (ACHRE No. DOE-052295-A-1), as quoted in Advisory Committee 
on Human Radiation Experiments: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS. (New York: Oxford University Press 
1996), posted at https://bioethicsarchive. georgetown.edu/achre/final/chap1_2.html 
[accessed 14 Sep. 2014]. 
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either compel his wife to have the operation or to prevent it. Actually, 
he is entitled to a full explanation…31 
 
Pater McEwan (1881-1973) was an honorary surgeon at the Bradford Royal 
Infirmary at the time the article was published.32 
 
  EARLIER NEAR MISSES 
 
 The practice of informed consent was described in medical literature 
long before this without using the term “informed consent.” There are even 
some near misses, such as an 1830 medical report: 
 
James Alexander, aet. 9, from Arbroath, entered the Hospital on the 
2d February, on account of a disease of the elbow-joint, under which 
he had laboured eighteen months. The bone can be felt extensively 
diseased, and the case seems in all respects a favourable one for 
excision, which will be performed so soon as the parents are informed 
and give their consent.33 
 
Another example is from J.W. Willcock’s 1830 legal book: 
 
When an experiment of this kind is performed with the consent of the 
party subjected to it, after he has been informed that it is an 
experiment, the practitioner is answerable neither in damages to the 
individual, nor in any criminal proceeding; although the result be 
contrary to expectation, and attended with an injury which has not 
generally attended the ordinary mode of practice. But if the 
practitioner performs his experiment without giving such information 
to, and obtaining the consent of, his patient, he is liable to 
compensate in damages any injury which may arise from his adopting 
a new mode of treatment.34 
 
NON-MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 
 
 Joseph Andrew Orban used the term “informed consent form” on 
pages 54 and 55 of his 1954 Ph. D. thesis at Virginia Polytechnic Institute on 
Ability measurement, test bias reduction, and psychological reactions to 
testing as a function of computer adaptive testing versus conventional testing. 
 
 
31 Peter McEwan, A study of hysterectomy, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 1:574, 576 (Mar. 31, 
1934). 
32 P. McEwan, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 494 (Feb. 24, 1973). 
33 Quarterly report of the Edinburgh Surgical Hospital, EDINBURGH MEDICAL AND SURGICAL 
JOURNAL, 33:229, 234 (April 1, 1830) 
34 J.W. Willcock, THE LAWS RELATING TO THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (London: A. Strahan 
1830), 110 
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WORKER’S COMPENSATION  
 
 One of the other contexts in which “informed consent” was used 
before Salgo was in worker’s compensation cases.  Similar to what was later 
done in the medical context, the courts recognized a duty of one person to 
provide information to another - the duty of the employer to inform the 
employee. It then used the term “informed consent” to describe the consent 
that was required.   
 
 In 1952, Arthur Larson wrote in his treatise - THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION: 
 
…the courts have been vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a 
deliberate and informed consent by the employee before employment 
relation will be held a bar to common-law suit.35 
 
 Three court decisions in Missouri from 1954 to 1956 cited this treatise 
and used the term “informed consent.” 
 
 In 1954, the Missouri Supreme Court wrote in Stroud v. Zuzich: 
 
And it has been said that, most important of all, the employee "loses 
the right to sue the special employer at common law for negligence; 
and when the question has been presented in this form, the courts 
have been vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a deliberate and 
informed consent by the employee before employment relation will be 
held a bar to common-law suit." Vol. 1, Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation, § 48.10, p. 710 at pages 711-713.36 
 
 In 1956, it again quoted Larson in Andra v. St. Louis Fire Door 
Company: 
 
Most important of all, he loses the right to sue the special employer at 
common law for negligence; and when the question has been 
presented in this form, the courts have been very vigilant in insisting 
upon a showing of a deliberate and informed consent by the 
employee before employment relation will be held a bar to common-
law suit.37 
 
In 1956, Missouri Court of Appeals in St. Louis in the case of Schepp 
v. Mid City Trucking Co., applied Stroud and Andra, citing Larson’s treatise: 
 
35 Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1952), Vol. 1, § 48.10, p. 710 at pages 
711-713, as quoted in Stroud et al. v. Zuzich et al., 271 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Mo. Sup. Ct. Sept. 
13, 1954). 
36 Stroud v. Zuzich, 271 S.W.2d 549, at 556 (Mo. Sep. 13, 1954). 
37 Andra v. St. Louis Fire Door Co, Inc., 287 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Mo. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1956). 
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There is no express consent in the instant case. If it is present, it must 
be implied. The facts and circumstances and acts and conduct of all 
the parties must show a deliberate and informed consent by the 
claimant to the substitution of a new temporary employer. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, supra; Andra v. St. Louis Fire Door 
Company, Inc., supra, 287 S.W.2d 819(2). The consent must be 
voluntary. "An employee, for compensation purposes, cannot have an 
employer thrust upon him against his will or without his knowledge". 
Stroud v. Zuzich, Mo.Sup., 271 S.W.2d 549, 556(2, 3). Nor will he be 
held to have lost his original employer without his knowledge. There 
must be a "consensual" relationship between the loaned employee 
and the special employer. Stroud v. Zuzich, supra, 271 S.W.2d 556 
(2, 3).38 
 
In 1956, the Supreme Court of Vermont used “informed consent” in 
the worker’s compensation case of Mercier v. Holmes: 
 
In a case of this sort, then, there are three important considerations if 
the special employer is to become liable for workmen's compensation: 
first, there must be a contract of hire, express or implied, between the 
special employer and employee. The necessity for this is derived from 
the statute, itself, which we have quoted earlier. This involves an 
informed consent by the employee before the employment relation 
can be said to exist.39 
 
In 1954, the Industrial Commission of Florida decided a worker’s 
compensation case, Lindroth v. Rial, in which it cited Larson: 
 
Thus, he loses the right to sue the so-called employer at common law 
for negligence, and as pointed out by Larson in his recent treatise on 
Workmen's Compensation Law, section 48.10, in commenting on a 
related problem, when the question has been presented in this form, 
"the courts have been very vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a 
deliberate and informed consent by the employee before employment 
relation will be held a bar to common law suit."… But the principle 
remains the same, that in such a case, to protect the rights of the so-
called employee, as well as those of the alleged employer, there must 
be a showing of "a deliberate and informed consent" to the 
employment relation by the alleged employee. The facts in the 
present case do not sustain the conclusion that such consent existed. 
For the reasons given, the claim is denied.40 
 
 
38 Schepp v. Mid City Trucking Co., 291 S.W.2d 633, 642 (June 12, 1956). 
39 Mercier v. Holmes, 119 Vt. 368, 125 A.2d 790, 795 (Oct. 2, 1956). 
40 Lindroth v. Rial, 6 Florida Supplement 4, 7 (Florida Industrial Commission Mar. 3, 1954). 
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POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
 “Informed consent” was used in several books and articles about 
politics and governance. In this context, the term is generally not used to 
place a duty on any individual to provide information to any other individual.  
The term is used to focus on the need for efforts to make information 
available to the relevant population to maintain its support.  
 
 In 1953, Fritz Morstein Marx wrote in the UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURG 
LAW REVIEW: 
 
…in a society of diversified interests, the legislature service as an 
agency of consent by composing disagreements. The means to attain 
this end is debate. It is by debate that issues are drawn and positions 
are tested. Disagreement is wanted for the sake of informed consent. 
Even the ultimate decision is meant to remain open to challenge. [p. 
157] 
Their presence assures both the continuity and the relevance of 
disagreement that is the foundation of informed consent. [p. 158]41 
 
At the time of his article, Fritz Morstein Marx (1900-1969) was working in the 
Bureau of the Budget of the Executive Office of the President and was an 
adjunct professor at American University.42 
 
 In 1951, in THE SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL SECURITY, the following 
appears under the heading Pupils should be helped to understand what must 
be done if national security is to be strengthened through improved civil and 
military education: 
 
 Consent is said to be the major social bond in our way of life. 
Obviously, this should always be an informed consent, the basis for 
which should be laid in our schools.  If, on the basis of informed 
consent, national security is to be strengthened through making 
needed improvements in civil and military aviation, it is necessary that 
pupils (as capabilities and maturity permit) be helped by schools 
to:….43 
 
 On 15 February 1951, the TIMES OF INDIA published as article headed 
Bombay Police Bill that stated: 
 
 
41 Fritz Morstein Marx, Legislation, representation, and the party system, UNIVERSITY OF 
PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW, 14(2):151, 157 & 158 (Winter 1953). 
42 In memoriam - Fritz Morstein Marx, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS, 2(4):716 (Fall 
1969). 
43 Charles W. Sanford, Harold C. Hand, and Willard B. Spalding (eds.), THE SCHOOLS AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1951), 241 
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For more than one good reason the local authorities would do well to 
refer the matter to the State Government and get their informed 
consent for any extension of the order beyond the space of four 
days.44 
 
 In the March 21, 1949 issue of CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
produced by the Policy Information Committee of the U.S. Department of 
State, there is a secret summary of an Advisory report prepared by expert for 
Liberian President that states: 
 
 In accordance with a request from the President of Liberia for 
expert advice on legislation providing for the establishment of 
Corporation and Maritime Codes and authorizing the creation of an 
International trust Company, a report has been prepared for 
submission to the Liberian government. The report is a personal one 
from Francis A. Truslow, President of the New York Curb Exchange 
and former head of the Rubber Development Corporation. While it 
does not have have our official stamp of approval and is not a US 
document, we take no exception to it….. The new legislation would 
include the unobjectionable features of the old and would provide for: 
1) inclusion in the Corporation Code of safeguards to insure “informed 
consent” by stockholders prior to important action by management…45 
 
 The May 1, 1950 issue of the same periodical contains a secret report 
of the adoption of the recommendations by Liberia. It states: 
 
The Truslow report recommended legislation which would include the 
unobjectionable features of the old and would, in addition, provide for 
safeguards in the corporation code and the Trust Act to insure 
informed consent by stockholders prior to important action by 
management…46 
 
 On August 14, 1947, in the parliamentary debates in the New Zealand 
House of Representatives on the report of the New Zealand delegation to the 
United Nations, Ronald Algie (who in the 1960s became Speaker of the 
House of Representatives) said: 
 
 
44 Bombay Police Bill, TIMES OF INDIA, 15 Feb 1951, 4. 
45 Advisory report prepared by expert for Liberian President, in U.S. Department of State, 
Policy Information Committee, CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, Issue NO. 194, 3 (March 
21, 1949). 
46 Liberia accepts economic plans - Adoption of Truslow recommendations, U.S. Department 
of State, Policy Information Committee, CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, Issue No. 252, 
9 (May 1, 1950). 
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No peace treaty has any permanence or validity at all except in so far 
as it rests on the consent of the people, and consent is of no value 
unless it is intelligent and informed consent.47 
 
In 1945, Luther Harris Evans wrote in his book THE VIRGIN ISLANDS: 
FROM NAVAL BASE TO THE NEW DEAL: 
 
A local executive who could govern with their informed consent 
without the intervention of self-seeking local leaders, would be in a 
position to govern much better than an executive depending on the 
consent of these leaders.48 
 
Luther Harris Evans (1902-1981) was the Director of the Historical Records 
Survey of the Works Progress Administration, Librarian of Congress from 
1945 to 1953, and later the director general of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).49 
 
In 1943, the book MOBILIZING EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES: FOR WINNING 
THE WAR AND THE PEACE included chapter 5 entitled The Disorganized 
Teaching Profession by Harold C. Hand. It included:  
 
In other words, we have government by consent. Obviously this kind 
of government can succeed only if based on an informed consent, 
and the success of our democracy depends upon the freedom of 
pupils to learn.50 
 
When this was written, Harold Curtis Hand was a Professor of Education at 
the University of Maryland. He later became a Professor of Education at the 
University of Illinois.  
 
In 1940, Percival E. Jackson wrote in LOOK AT THE LAW: THE LAW IS 
WHAT THE LAYMAN MAKES IT: 
 
By the same token, the law must express the free and informed will of 
the majority, and rest upon the free and informed consent of the 
 
47 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (Wellington, New Zealand: E.V. Paul 1948), Vol. 277, 370.  
48 Luther Harris Evans, THE VIRGIN ISLANDS: FROM NAVAL BASE TO NEW DEAL (Ann Arbor MI: 
J.W. Edwards 1945), 94. 
49 Luther Evans - Previous Librarians of Congress, posted at the Library of Congress 
website - http://www.loc.gov/about/about-the-librarian/previous-librarians-of-congress/luther-
evans/  [accessed 28 March 2015]. 
50 Harold C. Hand The disorganized teaching profession, in Ernest Oscar Melby (Ed.), 
MOBILIZING EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES: FOR WINNING THE WAR AND THE PEACE (Harper & 
Brothers 1943), 64, at 76. 
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minority, else we lend aid to those who would destroy our democratic 
system.51 
 
Percival E. Jackson was a New York City lawyer who wrote many legal 
books. 
 
 In 1940, the term appeared in a book ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS – 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
 
Without planning, democratically arrived at thru an informed consent, 
there is no assurance that the best use will be made of our 
resources…52 
 
 In 1939, Grenville Clark wrote in an article, The limits of free 
expression: 
 
But “consent of the governed” is no mere phrase. It implies that the 
consent shall be real. And this in turn implies two conditions – first, 
that the consent shall not be coerced, and, second, that it shall be 
reasonably well-informed. But how can there be a real and informed 
consent without discussion?53 
 
In the same year, Clark gave a jubilee law lecture at the Catholic 
University of America entitled “Law and civil liberty”: 
 
I have put forward the thought that, on analysis, the maintenance of 
free discussion with relation to the problems of government and of all 
our social and economic relations is not a matter of real choice if we 
would retain our basic philosophy; I have said that its maintenance is 
a matter of necessity if the informed consent that makes free 
institutions workable is to prevail.54 
Grenville Clark (1882-1967) was a New York City lawyer who was a member 
of the Corporation that governs Harvard University.55 
 In 1939, Ordway Tead wrote in NEW ADVENTURES IN DEMOCRACY: 
 
 
51 Percival E. Jackson, LOOK AT THE LAW: THE LAW IS WHAT THE LAYMAN MAKES IT (New York: 
E.P. Dutton 1940), 336. 
52 ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS – NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Washington DC). 78:799 (1940).  
53 Grenville Clark, The limits of free expression, 73 UNITED STATES LAW REVIEW 392, 394 
(1939). 
54 Grenville Clark, Law and Civil Liberty, JUBILEE LAW LECTURES, 1889-1939 (Washington 
DC: Catholic Univ. of Am. Press 1939), 126, 142. 
55 Nancy Peterson Hill, A VERY PRIVATE PUBLIC CITIZEN: THE LIFE OF GRENVILLE CLARK 
(Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press 2014) 
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American professions of democracy, starting with the social contract 
in the cabin of the Mayflower, have more or less implicitly 
acknowledged that each individual personality was uniquely worthful. 
They have affirmed that the active, explicit and informed consent of 
the governed was vital as a means of assuring that self-choice and 
self-assumption of operating responsibility were present as conditions 
of the development of personality…56 
 
Ordway Tead (1891-1973) taught industrial relations at Columbia University 
and was chair of the New York Board of Higher Education from 1938 to 
1953.57 
 
 In 1938, Edward McNall Burns wrote in JAMES MADISON, PHILOSOPHER 
OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
 
The major concern of its [democracy] exponents has been to defend 
the common man against oppression resulting from the exercise of 
political power founded upon privilege and inequality – in other words 
to combat monarchy and heredity aristocracy, and to insist that 
government should rest upon the informed consent of the 
governed…58 
 
Edward McNall Burns (1897-1972) was a professor of history and a 
professor of political science at Rutgers University. 
 
 
 In 1937, Ordway Tead wrote in the journal SOCIAL FRONTIER: 
 
 A revitalizing of objectives and a sane and liberal handling of 
problems of policy and method wait fundamentally upon a realization 
that control in the public interest and informed consent of the 
interested groups are not extraneous or secondary to the whole 
problem of proper conduct of education…59 
 
This phrase was quoted in 1942 in chapter VII of EDUCATION AND SOCIETY. 60 
 
 In 1937, Stanford University published in THE CHALLENGE OF 
EDUCATION: 
 
56 Ordway Tead, NEW ADVENTURES IN DEMOCRACY (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw 
Hill 1939), 4. 
57 Tead, Orway (1891-1973), in Morgan Witzel, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
MANAGEMENT (A&C Black 2005), 493. 
58 Edward McNall Burns, JAMES MADISON, PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION (Rutgers Univ. 
Press 1938), 75 [Rutgers University studies in history, vol. 1]. 
59 Ordway Tead, Democracy in administration, SOCIAL FRONTIER, 3(22):105 (Jan. 1937). 
60 Samuel Smith, George Cressman & Robert Speer, editors, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY (New 
York: Dryden 1941), 218. 
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Since our democracy postulates a government by the consent of the 
governed, and since an informed consent was and is clearly intended, 
education very properly may be regarded as the life-giving principle of 
democracy.61 
 
 In 1936, Russell Hibbard wrote in an article Administration of the 
Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves and Compensation Act: 
 
In summary, Wisconsin’s administrative experience to date indicates 
the importance to other states of … participation in the law’s 
administration by the interested groups, through their chosen 
representatives, thereby securing that informed consent without which 
administration cannot function effectively in a democratic society.62 
 
When this was written, Russell Hibbard was a member of the Industrial 
Commission of Wisconsin that administered the unemployment 
compensation act.   
 
 In 1936, Paul Raushenbush presented the report of the Committee on 
Unemployment Compensation of International Association of Government 
Labor Officials. In the report he discussed the benefits of an advisory 
committee consisting of representatives of organized employees and 
employers: 
 
More generally, an advisory committee may help to bring about in the 
community that informed consent to unemployment compensation 
which is essential to the effective operation of any law in a 
democracy.63 
 
Paul Raushenbush (1898-1980) and his wife were important in the drafting 
and enactment of the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation law. He was 
serving as head of the Wisconsin Unemployment Division when this report 
was written.64  
 
  In 1933, Sallie Stockard wrote in the DAILY TIMES-NEWS in Burlington, 
North Carolina: 
 
 
61 Stanford University, School of Education, THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION (McGraw-Hill 
1937), 443. 
62 Russell Hibbard, Administration of the Wisconsin act, NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW, 
25:170, 175 (Mar. 1936). 
63 Paul Raushenbush, Present status of unemployment compensation, in United States 
Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, BULLETIN NO. 629: LABOR LAWS AND THEIR 
ADMINISTRATION 1936 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office 1937), 19, at 39. 
64 Papers of Paul and Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, Social Security Srchives, posted at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/archives/lizguide.htm [accessed Apr. 28, 2015]. 
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To come to an understanding takes talk, and time. All education takes 
talk, talk, talk. When the subject of the talk is the greatest interest of 
the country, how may a group be better employed, or more usefully 
use time than in the clear expression of what they honestly think. It 
gives allowances for the growth of ideas, and makes for gain. Let it 
not take the place of yielding, but be informed consent, deliberative, 
active.65 
 
In her article, she mentioned her indebtedness to The Labor Relations under 
the New Industrial Administration by Tead and Metcalf.  No such publication 
has been located. Perhaps, she was referring to Tead and Metcalf’s book 
LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE NEW RECOVERY ACT, which used the term 
“informed consent” [presented elsewhere in this article]. Sallie Walker 
Stockard (1869-1963) was a teacher and author of several history books. 
She was the first woman to receive a degree from the University of North 
Carolina.66  
 
 In 1929, in The states people and the round table conference, D.V. 
Gundappa wrote: 
 
…but not necessarily based on moral grounds always, in the sense 
that it is born of the intelligent and informed consent of the People…67 
 
D.V. Gundappa (1887-1975) was an Indian writer and philosopher. 
 
 In 1920, Hilderic Cousens wrote in his revision of John Bertram 
Askew’s PROS AND CONS: A NEWSPAPER READERS AND DEBATER’S GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING CONTROVERSIES OF THE DAY: 
 
(5) Federation would not take away from the Colonies powers they 
now possess, but rather add to them. It is essential that they be 
enabled to state their opinions on peace and war, for, at present, they 
find themselves involved in wars without their informed consent.68 
 
“Informed consent” did not appear in earlier editions of the book. Hilderic 
Cousins was a member of the Chandos Group in London. He was involved 
 
65 Sallie Stockard, NRA – The Blueeagle – Meaning, Labor, Relations, DAILY TIMES-NEWS 
(Burlington, N.C.), Sep. 18, 1938, 4. 
66 Stockard, Sallie Walker, posted at http://ncpedia.org/biography/stockard-sallie [accessed 
Mar. 27, 2015]. 
67 D.V. Gundappa, The states people and the round table conference, INDIAN REVIEW, 
30:789, 790 (Dec. 1929). 
68 John Bertram Askew & Hilderic Cousens, PROS AND CONS: A NEWSPAPER READERS AND 
DEBATER’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CONTROVERSIES OF THE DAY (6th edition revised and 
rewritten by Hilderic Cousins) (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. Nov. 1920), 71. 
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in the Douglas Social Credit movement. He assisted Bertrand Russell in 
writing his book PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM.69 
 
 On July 18, 1919, in the debate in the British House of Commons on a 
loan guarantee for the government of Soudan [sic], Sir Ryland Adkins stated:  
 
There can be no reason why anyone should obstruct the passage of 
this Vote, and I imagine that there is a wish on the part of all 
interested in it, and whose imagination has been stirred by, the great 
historic problems of the Nile valley, that this enlargement of guarantee 
shall be done with the informed consent of this Committee and the 
public, as a matter which will not end here and is not meant to end 
here.70 
 
Ryland Adkins (1862-1925) was an English barrister, judge and member of 
parliament (1906-1923). 
 
 In 1917, the NEW REPUBLIC published an editorial - The diplomacy of 
publicity - that included:  
 
As President Wilson himself has said, “It is in the full disclosing light of 
that thought (the thought of the plain people here and everywhere 
throughout the world) that all policies must be conceived and 
executed in this midday hour of the world’s life”; and by insisting on 
the democratic diplomacy of full publicity President Wilson has only 
been seeking to provide a foundation in the method and spirit of 
international negotiation and intercourse for the permanent 
emergence by America from its traditional isolation. The American 
people cannot be depended upon permanently to underwrite any 
settlement of the war which rests rather upon the indefinite 
employment of armed force than upon the willing and well informed 
consent of all the peoples.71 
 
BROKER RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the federal courts 
used the term “informed consent” to describe the fiduciary standard for the 
responsibility of brokers to make disclosures to their investor clients. Thus, 
like in the medical context, the term is being used to state a duty - the duty of 
the broker to provide information to investor clients. 
 
69 Miranda B. Hickman (ed.), ONE MUST NOT GO ALTOGETHER WITH THE TIDE: THE LETTERS OF 
EZRA POUND AND STANLEY NOTT (McGill-Queen’s Press 2011), 332; Brian Burkitt & Francis 
Hutchinson, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CREDIT AND GUILD SOCIALISM (Routledge 
2008); Bertrand Russell, PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM (1919).  
70 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES - OFFICIAL REPORT - HOUSE OF COMMONS (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office 1919), Fifth Series, Vol. 118, 859. 
71 The diplomacy of publicity, NEW REPUBLIC (New York), 13:162-164, 163 (Dec. 13, 1917). 
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 In 1951, the SEC used “informed consent” in the case of In the Matter 
of Moore & Company: 
 
In the position he thus occupied, it was improper for Furlong to 
purchase for his own account securities which he contemporaneously 
resold to his customers at a profit, without the customers’ informed 
consent based upon a full disclosure of every vital particular touching 
the transaction.72 
 
 In 1949, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia stated in the case of Hughes v. Securities Exchange Commission: 
 
After making an independent review of the record, the Commission 
issued an opinion dated February 18, 1948, in which the Commission 
found that petitioner was a fiduciary, that as such she was under a 
duty to make full disclosure of her adverse interest, that no such 
complete disclosure was made, and that her clients had not given 
their 'informed consent' to her taking a position adverse to their 
interests. …  
The best price currently obtainable in the open market and the cost to 
registrant are both material facts within the meaning of the above-
quoted language and they are both factors without which informed 
consent to a fiduciary's acting in a dual and conflicting role is 
impossible.” …  
Secondly, even assuming, as urged by amici, that all of petitioner's 
clients are persons of more than average experience and intelligence 
with regard to the conceded intricacies of securities transactions, an 
assumption which is at best dubious in view of the present record, 
their full knowledge that petitioner either sold them securities she then 
owned or bought securities in her own name and then resold them to 
the clients cannot be considered sufficient knowledge to enable the 
clients to give their informed consent.73 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the SEC decision. Here are excerpts 
from the SEC decision that use “informed consent.” 
 
To prevent any conflict and the possible subordination of this duty to 
act solely for the benefit of the principal, a fiduciary at common law is 
forbidden to deal as an adverse party with his principal. An exception 
is made, however, where the principal gives his informed consent to 
such dealings. [p. 635] 
 
72 In the Matter of Moore & Company, 32 SEC 191, 196 (Jan. 10, 1951). 
73 Hughes v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 56, 174 F.2d 969, 
972 & 976 (May 9, 1949). 
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Registrant has an affirmative obligation to disclose all material facts to 
her clients in a manner which is clear enough so that a client is fully 
apprised of the facts and is in a position to give his informed consent. 
[p. 639] 
These statements are not expressions of persons who have given 
their informed consent to their adviser’s taking an adverse position in 
dealing with them. [p. 640] 
On the basis of the foregoing we conclude that registrant, after 
establishing a fiduciary relationship with her clients, has omitted to 
disclose material facts to such clients and has not obtained the 
informed consent which would provide the only possible justification 
for her dealing with such clients for her own account and under 
circumstances in which her self-interest might conflict with her 
fiduciary obligations to them. [p. 643] 
Finally, as we have already stated, the required disclosures must be 
made before the completion of the transaction so that the client can, 
in fact, give his informed consent to the proposed sale or purchase. 
[p. 646]74 
 
In 1950, Hugh L. Sowards excerpted the above Hughes SEC decision 
in his legal book - COMMENTS, CASES AMD MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 
- and included the first four of the above uses of “informed consent.75  Hugh 
L. Sowards (-1982) was a professor at the University of Miami School of Law 
and wrote major treatises on securities regulation.76 
 
 In 1948 in a YALE LAW JOURNAL article on over-the-counter trading, the 
author wrote: 
 
Whereas the Hughes decision requires divulging of market price, cost 
and capacity, the judicial rule holds that only capacity need to be 
revealed. From this disclosure courts have implied that the ensuing 
transaction enjoys the client’s informed consent, on the apparent 
assumption that, thus warned, the clients can protect themselves by 
checking elsewhere the value of the securities involved.77  
 
In 1948 in a VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW article on over-the-counter 
securities, the author wrote: 
 
 
74 In the Matter of Arleen W. Hughes doing business as E.W. Hughes & Company, 27 SEC 
629 (Feb. 18, 1948). 
75 Hugh L. Sowards, COMMENTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE (Buffalo, 
N.Y.: Dennis & Co. Inc. 1950), 870, 871, 874, 877. 
76 James S. Mofsky, In memoriam Hugh L. Sowards, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW, 
36:xix-xx (1982). 
77 Disclosure requirements on over-the-counter trading, YALE LAW JOURNAL, 57(7):1316, 
1321 (June 1948). 
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It is well settled that by the mere form of the words employed as a 
confirmation, a broker cannot transform himself into a principal at will. 
Where the elements of agency exist only the specific and informed 
consent of the customer is sufficient to change such a relationship.78 
 
In 1946, the Securities Exchange Commission used “informed 
consent” in three decisions. In the Matter of Oxford Company, Inc., included: 
 
That role could not be changed without explicit and informed consent 
in each case prior to the completion of the transaction… 
To hold that a securities firm can, under the circumstances outlined in 
this case, validly act as a principle would be to ignore the meaning of 
the act, and permit the firm, without particular, explicit, and informed 
consent, by a mere play of words to shift its position in the course of 
the transaction to suit the convenience of the moment.79 
 
In the Matter of Investment Registry of America, Inc., included: 
 
While it is not necessary, for the purposes of this case to discuss the 
question at length (see Oxford Company, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 681 (1946), 
it is fundamental that a broker cannot, by a mere form of words 
employed in a confirmation, transform himself at will into a principal. 
Where the elements of agency exist in the relationship (as e.g.. in this 
case the reliance of customers on respondent’s rendition of 
investment advice, prior dealings, and so forth) only specific and 
informed consent of the customer is sufficient to change the 
relationship.80 
 
   In the Matter of Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., quoted Oxford at 885, and 
further included: 
 
To procure assent for specific transactions was only part of 
respondent’s duty. That assent should have been a fully informed 
consent to respondent’s acting at arms length as a dealer. [p. 884] 
A broker-dealer vested with a power which, in its precise terms, limits 
the authority to that of a broker cannot without the informed consent of 
the customers act as a principal and point to our rules in justification. 
[p. 895]81 
 
 
78 L. Guy Clinton, Over-the-counter securities markets, 1 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 602, 617 
(1948). 
79 In the Matter of Oxford Company, Inc., 21 SEC 681, 692 (Jan. 3, 1946), SEC Securities 
Act Release No. 3769 (Jan. 4, 1946), 15. 
80 In the Matter of Investment Registry of America, Inc., 21 SEC 745 (Jan. 10, 1946). 
81 In the Matter of Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 SEC 865 (Jan. 22, 1946). 
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The discussion of the Oxford case in the 1946 SEC annual report 
included: 
 
 The Commission held that under all of the circumstances the firm was 
under the duty to act as agent for the customer in the absence of 
explicit and informed consent to the firm's acting as principal.82 
 
 In a 1946 article in the CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW about California state 
security issues, T.W. Dahlquist wrote: 
 
If he deals adversely to this principal, or serves dual interests, full and 
complete disclosure must be made and an informed consent thereto 
obtained. [p. 713] 
Non-action by the customer after receiving the dealer confirmation 
does not constitute ratification. Subsequent ratification would require 
complete disclosure and explicit, affirmative and informed consent by 
the customer. [p. 715] 
But even high-grade securities firms which conduct their nonposition 
trading on the basis of a fair and reasonable spread - sometimes at a 
gross profit of only one-half point - must clearly bring home to their 
customers explicit knowledge, at the outset of the transaction, that 
they are acting in a dealer capacity, and must obtain the customer’s 
informed consent to such relationship.83 
 
T.W. Dahlquist was a San Francisco attorney. He was the student editor of 
the California Law Review in 1922. 
 
 In a 1946 article in the Harvard Law review about federal regulation of 
brokers and dealers, William Taft Lesh wrote: 
  
The Commission further said that to hold in these circumstances that 
a securities firm can validly act as a principal would be to ignore the 
meaning of the statute, “and permit the firm, without particular, 
explicit, and informed consent, by a mere play of words, to shift its 
position in the course of the transaction to suit the convenience of the 
moment.”84 
 
 
82 Regulation of Brokers and Dealers, Administration of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION - FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 1946  (Washington DC: U.S. G.P. O. 1947), 35. 
83 T.W. Dahlquist, Regulations and civil liability under the California Corporate Securities 
Act: IV, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 34(4):695 (Dec. 1946). 
84 William Taft Lesh, Federal regulation of over-the-counter brokers and dealers in 
securities, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 59(8):1237, 1264-65 (Oct. 1946), quoting the Oxford 
decision.  
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William Taft Lesh (1906-1993) was Special Counsel to the Trading and 
Exchange Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time 
he wrote this article.85 
 
In a 1945 review of securities issues, Chester T. Lane and George S. 
Parlin wrote:  
 
The court declined to disturb an order of the Commission which 
conditioned the delisting of securities by a requirement that the 
informed consent of the security holders be first obtained. [p. 634, 
note 3] 
Requiring the informed consent of the security holders was, as argued 
by the applicant, a long step beyond prior precedents. [p. 639]86 
 
Chester T. Lane was Deputy Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department 
of State and former Chief Counsel of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1938-1942). George S. Parlin was an Assistant General 
Counsel with the Securities and Exchange Commission.87 
 
 Note that there was a near miss in which the term was almost used in 
a March 1944, SEC opinion: 
 
 When the relationship between a broker-dealer and his 
customer is established as one of agent and principal, it is not within 
the agent’s power to free himself from his duties to act as such in 
transactions with his principal without the clearest warning…. There 
was nothing to prevent Davis and Fleming from altering this 
relationship by mutual, informed, consent….88 
 
ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITES 
 
 The practice of law is another context in which there is a professional 
duty of disclosure and “informed consent” has been used to describe the 
actions of clients when the attorney has satisfied the duty of disclosure. 
 
 In 1948, the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of People ex rel. 
Kent v. Denious, claiming professional misconduct by an attorney, used the 
term “informed consent” to describe the standard for the responsibility of 
attorneys to make disclosures to their clients: 
 
85 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 59(8):1276 (Oct. 1946), 
86 Chester T. Lane & George S. Parlin, Security issues and Exchanges, 1945 ANNUAL 
SURVEY AMERICAN LAW 634, 639 (1945) [discussing Shawmut Association v. Securities 
Exchange Commission, 146 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1945). The term “informed consent” is not 
used in the Shawmut decision.]. 
87 Ibid., at 634. 
88 In the Matter of Bond & Goodwin, Incorporated, 15 SEC 584, at 594 (Mar. 17, 1944). 
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The question of respondent's intent in taking title to these properties is 
the all-important question involved in this proceeding. If, as he 
declares, and as the manager testified he was told, respondent took 
title subject to petitioner's approval and with intent of obtaining her 
informed consent thereto, the transaction was still improper, but not 
venal nor sufficient cause to justify disbarment or suspension in the 
situation here presented;…89 
 
 The duty of disclosure to clients predates the use of the term  
“informed consent.” Canon 6 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar 
Association adopted in 1908 includes: 
 
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by the 
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the 
facts.90 
 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
 
 Trusts and estates were the context in which fiduciary duties 
originated.  Trustees have a duty of disclosure to the beneficiaries of trusts. 
“Informed consent” has been used to describe the actions of beneficiaries  
when the trustee has satisfied this duty. 
 
 In 1940, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia used “informed consent” in describing the responsibilities of 
trustees in the case of Earll v. Picken: 
 
…the sale was invalid upon the principle that a trustee is not permitted 
to buy in the trust property on his own account without permission of 
the court or informed consent of the beneficiaries;…91 
 
 In 1938, A New York Surrogate’s Court stated in In re Estate of S. 
Agnes Smith: 
 
There is no reason for a requirement of unnecessary expenditure or 
useless waste of the time of all concerned when it is evident that this 
is unnecessary by reason of the informed consent to the payment of 
all persons who may by any possibility possess any interest in the 
subject-matter, provided such persons are all sui juris.92  
 
89 People ex rel. Kent v. Denious, 118 Colo. 342, 353, 196 P.2d 257, 263 (June 28, 1948). 
90 James M. Alman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW, 
71(6):2395-2508 (2003), appendix at 5. 
91 Earll v. Picken, 113 F.2d 150, at 158, 72 App. D.C. 91 (Apr. 15, 1940). 
92 In re Estate of S. Agnes Smith, 169 Misc. 615, 617, 8 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 8, 
1938). 
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LABOR RELATIONS 
 
 The use of the term “informed consent” in the area of labor relations is 
more akin to its use in the area of politics and governance. It is not used to 
reflect a duty of one individual to inform another.  It is used to reflect the 
general need to provide sufficient information so that participants in the 
process of labor relations can fulfill their duties of representation and 
promote labor peace.  
 
 In 1933, Henry C. Metcalf wrote in an article A new industrial 
partnership: 
 
Employee representation is functionally a logical and essential 
element in the plan of organization which industry is slowly developing 
- a plan by which in each administrative area and on each 
administrative level the process of executive direction and control is 
tempered by representative deliberation and active, informed 
consent.93 
 
Henry C. Metcalf (1867-1942) was an organizational theorist and professor 
of political science at Tufts College.  
 
 Ordway Tead and Henry Clay Metcalf repeated this statement virtually 
verbatim in their 1933 book, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT: 
 
 In short, employee representation promises to become a 
permanent feature of corporate relations with employees because it id 
functionally a logical and essential element in the plan of organization 
which industry is slowly developing - a plan in which each 
administrative area and at each administrative level the process of 
executive direction and control is tempered by representative and 
active, informed consent.94 
 
  In 1920, “informed consent” appeared in an industrial relations circular 
from the University of Wisconsin: 
 
It is fairly safe, then, to urge that all labor auditing be performed under 
joint direction and by the free and informed consent of the workers.95 
 
 
93 Henry C. Metcalf, A new industrial partnership, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, 236(6):531, at 
535 (Dec. 1933).  
94 Ordway Tead and Henry Clayton Metcalf, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT 
(New York: Whittlesey House 1933, 100-101. 
95 The University of Wisconsin – University Extension Division - Department Group and 
Community Service - Bureau of Commercial and Industrial Relations, Circular No. 2,  
A LABOR POLICY AND THE LABOR AUDIT (August 30, 1920), 13. 
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OTHER CONTEXTS 
 
 “Informed consent” has been used in a few other contexts that are not 
tied to imposing a duty of disclosure.  
 
 On July 5, 1957, a federal court in Louisiana considered a motion in a 
criminal case to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant. The 
government claimed consent. The court stated: 
 
 It is fundamental, in the absence of a valid warrant, either of 
arrest or for a search, that the burden of proving there was a truly 
voluntary and fully informed consent rests upon the Government…96 
 
The court found that the standard had not been met and suppressed the 
evidence.  
 
 In 1953, Middletown (Ohio) Lincoln Mercury published advertisements 
in the local newspaper that included the line: 
 
 No replacements are ever made without your informed consent.97 
 
 On 12 July 1942, the RACINE (Wis) JOURNAL TIMES SUNDAY BULLETIN 
published an article from Des Moines, Iowa, about a student who was having 
trouble enlisting. It included: 
 
Informed consent of his parents necessary before he could be drafted 
because technically he was still 19.98 
 
 Harold A. Phelps discussed divorce in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS. In the revised edition published in 1942, he wrote: 
 
 Essential Conditions of Marriage….In the third place, the 
consent of the parties must be free, deliberate, and informed… 
  
…Divorce enters as a problem in the third condition, because, in 
basing the validity of the marriage contract upon free, deliberate, and 
informed consent, one presupposes (according to the advocates of 
divorce) a condition contrary to fact.99 
 
96 United States v. Kidd, 153 F. Supp. 606, 609 (W.D. La. July 5, 1957). 
97 MIDDLETOWN JOURNAL (Ohio), 27 Nov. 1953, 20. The ad was repeated 1 Jan 1954, 3 Nov 
1954 and 10 Nov 1954. 
98 An open letter to ‘der Fuehrer,’ RACINE (Wis) JOURNAL TIMES SUNDAY BULLETIN, 12 July 
1942, 1. 
99 Harold A. Phelps, CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS   (New York: Prentice-Hall 1942) [the 
first sentence is cited as a quote from T.A. Lacey, MARRIAGE IN CHURCH AND STATE (London 
1912), 26-29] 
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Harold A. Phelps was a professor of sociology at the University of Pittsburgh 
and managing editor of the American Sociology review. 
 
 On March 4, 1940, the MANITOBAN in Winnipeg, Canada, published an 
article about creating a student court of appeal in the University of Manitoba 
Student Union. It included the following sentence: 
 
In this way new law has crept into student government without having 
the informed consent of the faculty representatives.100  
 
 In 1911, C. Anderson Scott wrote in an article, The Epistle to 
Philemon: 
 
 Philemon must have an opportunity of proving his love, but in a 
different way from that, and with the full and informed consent of his 
will.101  
 
This is the earliest use of “informed consent” that has been located. C. 
Anderson Scott was a professor at Westminster College in Cambridge, 
England.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Over sixty sources that used the term “informed consent” before the 
Salgo court decision have been included in this review.  Thus, the term has a 
more extensive history than has generally been recognized.  
 
 It is likely that some of the early uses of “informed consent” were not 
intended to be the use of a term, but were simply the use of “informed” as a 
adjective describing the “consent.”  However, clearly many of the later uses 
were intended to be a term. 
 
 No evidence has been found of whether the term moved between the 
contexts or was independently developed in each context.  The lack of cross-
references in any of the cited uses suggests independent development.  
 
100 There seems to be some argument for a student court of appeal, MANITOBAN (Winnipeg), 
March 4, 1940, 3. 
101 C. Anderson Scott, The Epistle to Philemon, in THE EXPOSITOR (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton 1911), 2:328, at 332. 
 
